New on-chain data shows that Grinex processed more than $8.7 billion USDT
between March 6 and November 10, with a significant portion of funds flowing
through top 10 centralized exchanges listed on CoinMarketCap, both before and after U.S. sanctions.
Between March 6 and August 14, before the platform was added to the OFAC SDN
list, Grinex handled a total of $7.29 billion USDT ($3.63B incoming + $3.66B
outgoing), averaging roughly $1.33 billion per month. Out of this amount, $3.58
billion USDT moved through centralized exchanges ($1.83B incoming + $1.75B
outgoing) — around $653 million per month, showing that the platform relied
predominantly on large, high-volume centralized exchanges for moving funds.
Img. 1 Grinex counterparty exposure before sanctions. Mar 6–Aug 14 2025
After sanctions were imposed on August 14, activity fell but continued at a significant scale. Over the next three months, Grinex processed $1.41 billion USDT ($702.8M incoming + $710.4M outgoing), or approximately $471 million per month. Of this amount, $733 million USDT flowed through centralized exchanges ($379M incoming + $354M outgoing), averaging $244 million per month even under
restrictions.
Img. 2 Grinex counterparty exposure after sanctions. Aug 14–Nov 10 2025
Critically, the share of funds routed to large, regulated exchanges increased after
sanctions. Before the SDN designation, centralized platforms accounted for roughly
50% of incoming and 48% of outgoing flows. After sanctions, these proportions rose
to nearly 54% of incoming and almost 50% of outgoing, indicating that Grinex
continued to rely on high-liquidity, top-tier exchanges despite reduced overall
activity.
Overall, sanctions lowered monthly volumes by ~ 60%, but Grinex remained active
and maintained — and proportionally increased — its dependence on major
centralized exchanges.
Before sanctions, the combined high-risk share across all Grinex transactions — both incoming and outgoing — was substantial. Around 11.8% of all incoming funds and 1.1% of outgoing funds originated from or were routed to high-risk entities, making high-risk exposure a notable part of the platform’s overall activity.
Img. 3 Grinex high-risk counterparty exposure before sanctions. Mar 6–Aug 14 2025
After sanctions, this combined exposure collapsed. High-risk sources dropped to
just 1.37%, while high-risk recipients accounted for only 1.96%. Taken together, this
represents a multi-fold reduction in total high-risk flows across the platform.
Img .4 Grinex high-risk counterparty exposure after sanctions. Aug 14–Nov 10 2025
A comparison of the two periods shows a clear pattern: sanctions sharply reduced
activity on Grinex, but they did not shut the platform down. Before the OFAC
designation, Grinex moved $7.29B, averaging $1.33B per month. After sanctions,
activity fell to $1.41B over three months, or roughly $471M per month — a decline of
about 60%, but far from a full halt. At the same time, the structure of Grinex’s flows changed in a way that may appear counterintuitive for a sanctioned entity.
The percentage of volumes moving through licensed, top-tier centralized exchanges increased after sanctions. Before the SDN listing, around half of Grinex’s incoming and outgoing funds passed through major CEX platforms. After sanctions, these shares grew even further, rising to nearly 54% of incoming and 50% of outgoing flows.
This means that while total activity dropped, a larger proportion of what remained
continued to rely on large regulated exchanges, suggesting that high-liquidity,
high-trust venues remained critical for Grinex’s operations even under restrictions. At the same time, high-risk flows declined sharply, with most high-risk sources
disappearing after August 14.
Overall, sanctions reshaped but did not dismantle the platform: Grinex became
smaller, less connected to high-risk entities, but more dependent proportionally on
licensed global exchanges.